Cuba: Between Imperialism and Socialism

A Report from My Participation in DSA’s Delegation to Cuba 

By Maria Franzblau

Street in a Havana neighborhood. Photo: Maria Franzblau

There are no boundaries in this struggle to the death. We cannot be indifferent to what happens anywhere in the world, for a victory by any country over imperialism is our victory; just as any country’s defeat is a defeat for all of us.”

Che Guevara, 1965

In late October, I traveled to Havana with over forty comrades as part of the Democratic Socialists of America’s first official, national delegation to Cuba. For five days our delegation, which was hosted by the ruling Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), met with government ministries and mass organizations, visited Havana neighborhoods, and donated medical and school supplies for a local hospital and a primary school.

The political content of this delegation was focused on arguably the single biggest crisis faced by Cuban society today: the criminal economic embargo imposed by the United States government. The US embargo, commonly known in Cuba as el bloqueo (blockade), was put in place shortly after the victory of the Revolution and blocked nearly all US trade with the island. In Havana, you can see some of the effects of this devastation, such as crumbling public infrastructure, long lines for food and gas, shortages of basic goods and medicine, and regular blackouts. The crisis has reached new intensity in recent years, caused by new sanctions under the Trump administration and maintained under Biden, the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on tourism, and decreased oil imports from Venezuela.

This article was first published in our Reform & Revolution magazine #14 together with the comment “Navigating Challenges and Defending Revolutionary Gains“.

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In response, Cuba’s government has chosen to allow a greater presence of private businesses on the island, and officially recognized both private property and foreign direct investment in their 2019 constitution. During our delegation, due to US sanctions barring American citizens from spending at Cuban state-owned enterprises, we saw several of the private shops, restaurants, and hotels in Havana. These businesses are primarily targeted at tourists and have introduced greater social inequality to the island, though to a much lesser degree than in capitalist nations. Another impact has been austerity, including a December 2023 proposal to either cut rations or raise fuel and electricity prices, with top officials citing Cuba’s recent 1-2% GDP decrease and 30% inflation rate as justification. 

But there is a second aspect of the crisis which we did not focus on during this delegation: a crisis of political legitimacy. Cuba’s government is a regime where decision-making power rests in the hands of the Central Committee of the PCC (the only legal political party) alongside its bureaucracy while the elected legislature is a disempowered rubber-stamp committee. Legally recognized mass organizations we met with on this delegation, like the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, Federation of Cuban Women, and the Workers’ Central Union of Cuba, are loyal to the bureaucracy, while independent political organizing is repressed.

In prior decades the party could rely on the gains of the revolution and the formidable leadership of Fidel Castro as a source of legitimacy. But as the economic crisis threatens the country’s social programs and leadership has passed to the less-popular Miguel Díaz-Canel, Cubans increasingly show dissatisfaction with life on the island. We see this in the mass protests of 2021, smaller localized demonstrations against shortages, and nearly 5% of the population emigrating away in the past two years.

Of course these crises, particularly that of the bureaucracy, must be put into context – the context of what it means to defend a socialist revolution in a poor, Caribbean nation 90 miles away from the most powerful capitalist empire in the world. Cuba has faced economic sabotage, an attempted invasion at the Bay of Pigs, assassination attempts on its leaders, terrorist attacks from far-right Cuban exiles, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Stalinism in Eastern Europe and with that a period of dramatic economic change in a very short timeframe, and groundlessly being placed on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List in 1982 and again in 2021. 

But just because these crises can be attributed to external forces doesn’t mean that every decision of the state has been correct or that every mistake has been inevitable. Nor does it mean that we, as US socialists, should be apathetic to the internal issues and debates of Cuban socialism while we narrowly focus on our own ruling class. To truly learn from the revolution, and to arm ourselves with the best analysis and messaging to fight the embargo at home, we must learn from the whole of this socialist project’s successes and failures.

I must also reaffirm that the revolution remains an inspiration as a testament to the gains working people can make when they seize power and resources from the capitalist class. In Cuba, we saw a healthcare system with free, universal treatment and doctors ingrained in every small town and barrio, while back home in the richest nation on Earth millions of people can’t afford basic care. We saw an education system which provides a free, quality education from primary school to university with a national curriculum, without the fragmentation, incoherence, and racial segregation present in the American system. We saw a religious, machista society which had in 2022 legalized same-sex marriage and adoption, and had already secured free abortion and gender-affirming care on demand, while states across the US roll back our most basic rights to bodily autonomy.

Cuba’s socialist project, even with a repressive state bureaucracy and crippling economic crisis, has made important achievements for the workers of Cuba and the world. It is our duty to support them against vicious attacks from imperialist powers, which begins by ending the US embargo. In giving this support, though, our aim should be to empower Cuban workers to gain democratic control of their economy and government, rather than pretending that this is already the case.

During my time on this Delegation, I think we succeeded in educating ourselves on the impacts the embargo has had on Cuban society, convincing many of us to consider organizing against the embargo in our own chapters. I believe we were far less successful, though, in understanding Cuban socialism in its full complexity or considering how to apply our findings to our organizing in the US. Because we were hosted by the Communist Party, the vast majority of our itinerary involved us meeting state or party officials and representatives from the party’s mass organizations. These meetings mostly consisted of us receiving lectures followed by a Q&A period, instead of any even exchange of ideas, tactics, and advice. On several occasions comrades asked our Cuban counterparts for advice on our own organizing, and consistently we were met with non-answers.

At no point in our itinerary did we meet with independent, critical, or alternative leftist voices, and criticisms of the country’s bureaucratic political structures were almost entirely absent. For this reason, I sought out and organized three meetings with critical leftists entirely separate from the official itinerary. While I give credit to the delegation organizers for never impeding my efforts and encouraging all of us to ask challenging questions, there was no intentional effort to introduce the critical perspective.

This report will not be a play-by-play account of everything we did on this delegation. For that, I would highly recommend people read “The Cuba Diaries” by Danny Valdes, a detailed and beautifully-written article from a New York DSA comrade who was also on this delegation. Instead, I will highlight a few key moments from my trip and how they inform my analysis of Cuban socialism and of DSA’s international approach.

CENESEX, Mariela Castro, and the Family Code

DSA members hear a presentation from Mariela Castro at CENESEX. Photo: Maria Franzblau

One of the most significant political developments in Cuba’s recent history was the passage of the 2022 Family Code, which legalized same-sex marriage and adoption and granted several other rights and recognitions to LGBTQ people. Initially, the provision on same-sex marriage was intended to be part of Cuba’s 2019 Constitution but, after counterpressure led by the churches, the government removed that provision and pushed it to a separate vote. The Party and its mass organizations campaigned extensively for the adoption of the Family Code and held public meetings across the country to allow citizens to give their feedback. Meanwhile, a notably large “No” campaign against the Family Code was led by the churches and right-wing dissident groups through social media. While the referendum passed, “No” received 33% of the vote, which is remarkably high for a government initiative in a one-party state.

A large part of the credit for this advancement belongs to the Cuban National Center for Sex Education, commonly known as CENESEX. This is a state-funded body known for advocating LGBTQ rights, led by Mariela Castro (niece of Fidel). This group has played an important role in advancing LGBTQ rights and struggling internally within the Communist Party against more socially conservative trends. It is also, though, the only state-sanctioned advocacy group on this topic while independent formations are repressed.

The PCC has had a remarkable transformation on LGBTQ rights over its 60-year history in power. For the first two decades of the Revolution, the Party took an actively homophobic stance, as the state forced gay men to work in labor camps in the late 1960s and Fidel Castro openly used homophobic slurs and declared that a homosexual could never embody the characteristics of a true revolutionary. In a 2010 interview, Castro took responsibility for the labor camps and expressed regret for abuses in them but did not apologize or acknowledge the camps as an explicitly homophobic policy. (For more on this, I recommend this brilliant piece by Andrés Pertierra). Through decades of research, organizing, and internal struggle within the Communist Party, CENESEX and Mariela Castro have helped transform Cuba into one of the most progressive nations in the world, let alone in Latin America, on LGBTQ rights.

In many ways, the Family Code represents the bureaucracy working at its best. They corrected an error in the party’s stances under the pressure of LGBTQ Cubans and the international movements for those rights, used mass meetings to influence public opinion and respond to it, and mobilized the party and its mass organizations to advance a “Yes” vote to expand womens’ and LGBTQ rights. But a lack of independent organizing or popularly-controlled institutions means that this was necessarily a slow going and top-down process. Put bluntly, Cuba’s transformation on LGBTQ rights was facilitated in no small part by Mariela Castro’s position as a prominent figure in the party bureaucracy with a famous family name.

We visited the center on our second day in Havana and heard a lecture from Mariela Castro about the history of CENESEX and of women’s and LGBTQ rights in Cuba. During the Q&A, one comrade asked for any advice Castro could give to US socialists fighting for queer rights. She mostly dodged the question regarding advice for US socialists, and she opted instead to describe her internal struggles within the Communist Party on this topic. She told the story of how she found old writings from her mother, the revolutionary Vilma Espin, in support of same-sex marriage and used it to argue for the Party to support same-sex marriage. She went on to describe the process of winning LGBTQ rights as a slow, gradual, consensus building project rather than a rapid, activist struggle.

Castro’s struggles within the party have been admirable and won considerable gains for queer people. But it is worth examining that, in response to a question about what LGBTQ organizing should look like, her answer was a course of action really only available to her: using old family documents to make an argument to top party brass. I was left wondering what avenues for change might exist for ordinary working people without the same access.

The Unsteady Balance of Democracy in the National Assembly

The delegation hears a presentation from Homero Acosta Álvarez in the National Assembly. Photo: Maria Franzblau.

Our first visit of the third day was to the National Assembly for People’s Power, or the Cuban parliament. We heard a presentation from Homero Acosta Álvarez, Secretary of the National Assembly, for an explanation on how the Cuban government functions. He explained that in their system, there are elections for municipal, provincial, and national assemblies. Multiple candidates may compete for the same seat in local elections, while there is only one candidate per seat for national elections and voting is done by approval. The National Candidacy Commission approves candidates for each race, and parties are technically prohibited from campaigning. 

This, he argued, was proof that the country has democratic processes for working people to engage with. In reality, though, the complete ban on the existence of other left-wing parties and strict restrictions on independent organizing means that the Communist Party bureaucracy dominates political life with very little check on their power. No nominee for the National Assembly in the 2023 elections lost a vote, and local municipalities have little capacity or autonomy to pursue independent initiatives.

Álvarez also described the process by which the 2019 constitution was drafted, developed, and approved. In the leadup to the referendum, a series of town halls were held across Cuba where ordinary people were able to voice their desires for the new constitution and could propose changes, even though decisions over what made it into the final draft were made entirely by the state. The constitution notably recognized private property and foreign direct investment for the first time since the Revolution.

This, Álvarez argued, was a “democratic” system. 

Certainly there are some advantages to Cuba’s system over that of a bourgeois democracy like the US. While US workers enjoy certain civil liberties like the rights of free association and assembly, our government still allows corporations and wealthy people to spend unchecked amounts to influence elections, denies millions of felons and immigrants the right to vote, strips women and LGBTQ people of the right to control our own bodies and leaves tens of millions impoverished and lacking healthcare and stable housing. (I’ve seen more homelessness on the streets of Los Angeles than I ever did in Havana). 

By contrast, the planned economy in Cuba allows services like healthcare, housing, and education to be provided for free (or in the case of state housing, with rents capped at 10% of family income) to the whole population, and the government will actively solicit input from ordinary people when considering big reforms like the 2019 constitution or subsequent Family Code.

Still, none of this alters the fact that Cuban political life is controlled by the impenetrable Communist Party bureaucracy and not by the working people themselves. Mass consultations take place and go away when the bureaucracy wishes for them to, and proposals are accepted or rejected on the same basis. Meanwhile, the creeping introduction of private business and austerity measures takes place completely outside of workers’ control.

Arguably the greatest clash in recent history between the PCC’s portrayal of its system and the actual undemocratic reality for most Cubans came on July 11, 2021 when the largest demonstrations in the country’s post-revolutionary history erupted across the island. Thousands of protestors poured into the streets in response to the economic crisis caused by US sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic, instability caused by the unification of Cuba’s dual currency system, and political frustrations with the government. The government replied by condemning the protestors as counter-revolutionary, arresting hundreds of people and using police to disperse protests, and implementing only small, temporary economic reforms.

During the Q&A, I asked the following question to Álvarez: “In 2021 there were mass protests across the whole island of Cuba. While it is true that many on the far-right supported these protests, and Washington cheered it on, the protests also involved thousands of ordinary Cubans, workers, feminists, socialists, and members of the CPC. Many participants from 2021 remain in prison today. How should Cubans who support the revolution but have criticisms of the government make their voices heard?”

He began his answer by condemning the US embargo for triggering the conditions which brought about the protests before addressing my points. He said of the government that “we don’t persecute ideas, we persecute actions.” He said the people still in prison aren’t there for protesting, they are there for vandalism and destruction of property. He briefly argued at the end that critical citizens have a right to express their views at every level of society already, though he didn’t elaborate on what those avenues look like.

It is certainly true that Cuba faces significant political and economic attacks from the US, and that there are some right-wing dissidents who participated in the July 11 protests who would align themselves with Miami anti-communists. But Álvarez’s answer accusing imprisoned protestors of being “rioters” does not justify the decade-long sentences given to some prisoners, and recalls the tough-on-crime rhetoric used by police in the US to disregard protestors’ concerns. Further, his answer did not acknowledge that even critical socialists in Cuba are completely lacking avenues through which to create change.

Introducing the Critical Left in Cuba

It is true that the Cuban economy is facing a historic crisis, due in large part to the US embargo and sanctions, and that the government is increasingly unpopular and facing a crisis of legitimacy. But that doesn’t mean that most Cubans support right-wing proposals to strangle the island’s economy; support for the US embargo is completely marginal within Cuban society, and support for a US-led military intervention like that proposed by Miami Mayor Francis Suarez is nonexistent. The reality is that there are still millions of Cubans who support socialism and the Revolution, and may even criticize the PCC from a left-wing perspective. 

One example of this is that in the first draft of the 2019 Constitution, the government had cut out the mention of “communism” as the Revolution’s goal, only to add it again in response to grassroots pressure from everyday Cubans who attended the town halls to give their input.

During my time in Havana, I made contact with several members of what is often called Cuba’s “critical left,” a term used to refer to left-wing activists, journalists, intellectuals, and everyday people who are critical of either certain policies of the PCC or broader systemic issues in the party bureaucracy. I organized three meetings, two with independent journalist Maykel Vivero and one with members of the leftist La Tizza collective. I also spoke to and attempted to meet with Marxist writer Frank Garcia Hernandez but could not arrange it while I was in Havana. 

The people I spoke to had different views and orientations towards the PCC; notably, Vivero and Hernadez both participated in and were imprisoned briefly during the 2021 protests while La Tizza did not participate in them. Still, I noticed three common themes:

1) The people I spoke to are socialists who are committed to revolutionary ideals.

2) They resolutely oppose the US embargo on Cuba and reject any imperialist aggression against their country.

3) While they all want some degree of economic and political reform, none support a regime change in Cuba, as that would open the door for a capitalist restoration on the island.

A Queer Perspective on Cuba’s Future

On the delegation’s second night I arranged a meeting with Maykel Vivero, an independent journalist and LGBTQ activist. A night later, I met him again alongside two other comrades from the delegation.

Maykel Vivero, who writes for a queer-focused publication called Tremenda Nota, is a socialist who is critical of both the US blockade and the Cuban government. In his analysis, the government has grown increasingly unpopular with most Cubans as the economic situation has worsened and people see less hope for a future on the island. Many young people have given up on political ideals and have instead come to view emigration to capitalist countries as the surest path to a better life. Politically, this has most benefited the right-wing of the opposition, as they can receive funding and political support from the United States and propagate their messages through social media. By contrast, the critical left as it is currently constituted is weak and marginal; repressed heavily by the government and lacking the external support given to the right-wingers.

Still, he acknowledges that the single biggest factor impacting Cuban society is the crushing US embargo. The tightening of sanctions under the Trump administration has led to shortages of food and medicine, undermining the state’s social programs and forcing it to allow more private businesses to take hold. While Vivero argues that there are still changes the government could make immediately – such as the release of political prisoners and allowing greater freedom of association – the most systemic change must happen through a change of policy in the United States. Absent that, the most likely possibilities for Cuba’s future would be 1.) a Chinese-style mixed economy, which would significantly increase inequality and leave workers without a democratic voice, or 2.) a full capitalist restoration, which would be a world-historic disaster for the working-class.

Regarding CENESEX, which I had visited earlier that day, Vivero said he had mixed views. As an LGBTQ person himself, he chafes at the tendency of Mariela Castro, a cisgender heterosexual woman, to purport to speak on behalf of Cuba’s LGBTQ community while independent organizers are suppressed. In 2019, he was one of several organizers of an independent pride rally in Havana, after the government abruptly canceled the state-sanctioned march, and the protest was denounced by CENESEX as a “provocation.”

Still, he argued that while CENESEX has moved slowly, its role has largely been a positive one. Tremenda Nota supported the 2022 Family Code, which he argued is a significant step forward for LGBTQ Cubans. The right-wing opposition, by contrast, campaigned strongly against the Family Code and condemned critical leftists for supporting the PCC’s position on the initiative.

This conversation indicated to me that there are significant differences between the right-wing dissidents movement – which aligns itself with the US and calls for a capitalist regime change – and the critical left, which supports socialism and is willing to engage in critical support for government initiatives like the Family Code.

The following night I organized another meeting with Maykel Vivero. This time I sent messages to the DSA Delegation group-chat in advance to encourage others to join me, and two comrades took me up on the offer. Initially, we intended to meet up again on the Malecón, but Vivero was having people over for a house party and we were invited to join him at his apartment.

Vivero was hanging out with several of his friends, all communists and leftists who enjoy talking politics and joking around. We joined them, huddled in the dark enjoying beer and music. We asked a few questions to the group about Cuba. Interestingly, two members of the group were Communist Party members with jobs in the government. One woman, who works as a local municipal deputy, said that she is fully pro-government, but that hers is now a minority position. The other party member concurred, but argued that the problem came down to “food, water, and medicine” and that all of Cuba’s problems could be solved if the embargo was removed, which then triggered a brief but fiery debate over whether political change is also needed. My task – translating a group of fast-talking debaters in a loud room to my two DSA comrades who didn’t speak Spanish – was not enviable.

Finally, we had a separate discussion with Vivero about several political topics. Most interesting was what he said when I told him about the question I had asked at the National Assembly about the July 2021 protests. Vivero, who was arrested briefly for participating in the protests, said this:

The July 11th protests were an expression of Cuba’s workers and poor. They may not understand the full scope and context of our country’s problems, but they are demanding resources they have a right to. They also demand political freedoms and the ability to control their own government. The protests were also against the capitalist policies of the Cuban government! People are angry that our government is building hotels when we don’t have food!

Insights From La Tizza Collective

On our fourth and final night I organized a meeting with three members of La Tizza Collective – a group of Cuban intellectuals who run an online publication on socialism in Cuba and abroad, autonomous from the state. For this night, with most of the delegation now aware of these unofficial meetings through my own promotion of them and word of mouth, eleven DSA members joined us for a meeting at our hotel.

In my own words, La Tizza Collective outlined the following: Lenin once argued that if socialism only exists in one nation, it is doomed to being dominated by capital. This seems to be taking place in Cuba as the country is increasingly economically isolated and strangled, and ways to secure revenue dry up. The natural response to this pressure is to introduce market reforms, like China and Vietnam have done, but this has been the subject of intense debate within party leadership. However, as the situation grows more desperate, the government seems to have come to the conclusion that it can introduce capitalist production but with socialist distribution. The greater presence of private businesses has also led to a number of “entrepreneurs” being members of the Communist Party. This raises an issue, though, which concerns many young people – is the revolution a project which is being actively constructed or an inheritance which they must simply defend? Many young people would like the opportunity to construct socialism and have a role in the decisions that get made, for instance through popular control of market reforms.

There have always been debates within Cuban society, but they haven’t always been allowed to take place openly. This raises another question: is it possible to have a “multi-polar” conception of socialism, where multiple perspectives are raised, or only a state line which needs to be followed?

La Tizza would describe themselves as being “autonomous” leftists, but not “independent.” All of La Tizza’s members, around a dozen people, are members of the Communist Party, and they view their project as taking place “within the revolution.” Still, their goal is to put forward a critical perspective not found in state publications like Granma.

Reflections on DSA’s International Approach

Internationalism means more than just solidarity. Within the global capitalist system, international events have repercussions for all countries. We see in Cuba’s history, for instance, how thoroughly their socialist project has been impacted by the fall of the Soviet Union, the rise and fall of Pink Tide governments in Latin America, and US foreign policy. For this reason, US socialists must be invested and engaged in these debates, seeking to learn from the successes and failures of international class struggles and seeking to teach others from our own.

While the vast majority of DSA members would agree with the importance of an international movement for socialism, there is significant disagreement within our organization about what specifically our role in its formation should look like.

When DSA engages with socialist parties and organizations in other countries, should we do so as diplomats or as organizers first? Should we seek a relationship of collaboration and discussion with the international left, including debates on strategy, or should we simply seek to learn from them? Should our fight against US imperialism be our only focus, or do we recognize that fight as our primary target in the global struggle against the international capitalist class?

I would argue that, historically, the approach of DSA’s International Committee has taken a “campist” approach to this debate. In this perspective, the primary contradiction in international politics is not between an international working-class and an international capitalist-class, but between the imperial “camp” led by the US as bulwarks of global capital, and the anti-imperial camp of nations which challenge US hegemony. In this analysis, DSA’s role should primarily be a diplomatic and solidaristic one. In their view, our goal is not to discuss with or debate those in the anti-imperial camp about how best to resist the pressures of imperialism, our goal is solely to fight our own nation’s imperialism. This view also entails a reluctance to ever criticize socialist parties in other countries.

While the makeup of the members on this delegation was diverse and multi-tendency, including members from every major caucus in DSA, the format of the trip and its messaging fell very firmly within the campist approach. A significant part of the delegation’s goals was to “model normalized relations” with Cuban officials, and our internal political analysis has consisted mostly of a focus on ending the US embargo and praise for Cuban socialism without a widespread reckoning with the internal crises and contradictions that are present. The format of our meetings with officials and organizations also reaffirmed that our role in this delegation is to learn rather than to engage as partners.

The current approach of the IC which I am describing was recently defended by a thorough article in The Activist by YDSA comrades Niko J. and Luca D., which I highly encourage people to read to better understand their perspective. In their piece, the authors defend the current orientation of the IC to engaging mostly with governing left parties instead of opposition, as well as avoiding public criticism of the former:

Rather than picking favorites based on perceived similarities in ideological composition or size, this approach entails aligning ourselves in solidarity with left-wing mass parties at the forefront of the struggle against imperialism. Our solidarity connects to how we publicly support or criticize movements of the Latin American left. Internal discussion and criticism is appropriate, but it’s important we consider to what extent criticisms may carry water for US hegemony and US-funded movements. This reality is important to any conception of “critical support”, which must prioritize efforts towards support as compared to criticism. We challenge US exceptionalism which centers our own importance and the idea that we have a right to be heard about every issue. While a critical analysis of ongoing socialist experiments is important and necessary, the way to help the working class of nations like Cuba and Venezuela is not to endlessly criticize their movements. This is especially true for communications from official organizational channels. By focusing on offering our solidarity and conducting anti-imperialist work we can provide real relief for our socialist comrades struggling against US imperialism.

I would agree with these comrades that we should not ignore ruling parties like the Communist Party of Cuba and that we should be careful and strategic with how we engage in public criticism. However, I reject the characterization that speaking to critical or independent leftists is about “picking favorites.” I have disagreements with comrades like Maykel Vivero and La Tizza, but engaging with them is an important part of understanding the conditions in Cuba and provides information that we wouldn’t have gotten from presentations which focus on towing a party line. I also disagree with the idea that it is “US exceptionalism” to discuss and debate politics with our Cuban comrades, whether it be the PCC or the critical left.

The practical effect of the IC’s approach, I would argue, has been that DSA will cheerlead for left-wing governments, refuse to engage with critics of these parties or educate our membership when they make bad decisions, and then awkwardly release a statement once things turn sour in that country. 

The most glaring, recent examples of this are in Chile and Peru, which both elected left-wing Presidents in 2021. In both instances, the IC correctly supported them against far-right opponents and sent delegations to these countries to act as election observers. After their elections, though, the IC went silent on these countries and held no more events to follow up and released no further statements. Chilean President Gabriel Boric moved politically towards the center, cratered his approval ratings, and failed to pass a proposed progressive constitution. Peruvian ex-President Pedro Castillo governed with right-wing parties, floundered in trying to pass any reforms in government, and was removed from office after a failed self-coup, only to be replaced by Dina Boluarte, a right-winger who has massacred indigenous protesters that were against her government. It was only after these projects suffered major defeats that the IC released new statements on Chile and Peru.

What if for Chile and Peru we had an approach to internationalism which sought to engage with comrades in discussion and debate, engaged with both ruling parties and left opposition, and didn’t avoid criticism when necessary? At the very least these could have been major teaching moments for US socialists, which teach us how not to deal with pressures from the far-right and capital. At most, we could have engaged with comrades in these countries to express our concerns and try to work collaboratively with them to help in their struggles.

Instead, neither of these possibilities took place and, when these failures happened, many DSA members were either left confused and with no analysis of what happened or they grew fatalistic and believed these failures were inevitable. With no meaningful change in our international strategy, I fear that we will be in a very similar, unprepared position if new crises were to arise in Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, or Cuba.

The Political Limits of Our Delegation

This delegation still represents a positive step for DSA’s international work, and I’m confident that the resulting discussions, debates, and follow-up actions which arise from it will lead to a growth in activity and consciousness around ending the embargo. But the campist, diplomacy-first approach of our IC places important limitations on the effectiveness of our work in three major ways.

The first weakness is in our analysis and understanding of Cuban socialism. There is no shortage of inspiration we can draw from positively appraising the Revolution’s gains in literacy, healthcare, education, and more. We should not deemphasize the role of the brutal US embargo in the country’s crises. But one simply cannot understand the full picture of Cuba this decade without also understanding the political repression of independent organizing, the threats that private business and austerity pose to the socialist economy, or the crisis of legitimacy the government faces. If one were to attend this delegation and fully accept the party line put forward in our itinerary, the political side of this crisis would go completely unmentioned.

Second, it limits the effectiveness of our external messaging and organizing, especially in regions of the country with large Hispanic and Cuban-American populations. While it is true that there are large sections of these diaspora communities, particularly Cuban exiles, who are hardcore reactionaries and have petty-bourgeois class interests, it would be a mistake to treat these communities as monolithic or immovable. In my own experience organizing in Miami, there is a large presence of Cubans in every local struggle, whether it be university students and faculty walking out against our far-right state legislature’s censorship of education, or local Starbucks workers’ struggling to unionize their stores.

In these struggles, there is often pressure for organizers to lower the banner of socialism and avoid talk of Cuba, if not to outright condemn the socialist government. As principled internationalists, we can afford to do neither. Instead, we should make our case for socialism and against the embargo in a grounded, defensible way to working people. One way of doing this is acknowledging basic facts recognized by the vast majority of Cubans, like the fact that independent political organizing is severely restricted and that institutions like the National Assembly act more as rubber stamp committees than as democratic representatives of the people. Another is being willing to voice criticism of the government when we think it makes mistakes, like in the suppression of an independent pride parade in 2019 or excessive sentences for political prisoners from the 2021 protests. Of course we shouldn’t center these criticisms in our public-facing work, but when pressed we shouldn’t deny that we have them or repeat a textbook account of how the National Assembly is “actually democratic” – not if we want our appeals to be taken seriously.

Third, and perhaps most jarringly, is that it doesn’t appear to me that we learned very many lessons which can be applied to organizing against the embargo in the US. We certainly raised the delegation’s consciousness and degree of knowledge about the embargo and Cuban politics generally, and many of us are already bringing those lessons back to our chapters and our communities, but we didn’t learn very much that would inform our practical organizing strategy and we didn’t trade ideas or tactics between ourselves and our Cuban counterparts.

To summarize my conclusions for future DSA delegations:

  1. Our delegations, if they are not for a discrete purpose like observing an election, should include longer meetings between DSA members and members of other parties and organizations. Instead of solely hearing lectures, we should have more collaborative discussions where we learn about each others’s organizing conditions and trade ideas. Where we can learn from each other, we should seek to. Where we disagree on key issues, we should feel free to discuss and debate these matters in a comradely way.
  2. We should place a high priority on hearing a diverse array of socialist perspectives. This means that we should engage with both ruling leftist parties and left-wing critics and opposition. We should work to keep DSA members informed of events and perspectives from across the world on a regular basis, not just in moments of great triumph or crisis. For example, if a country in Latin America elects a socialist head of state, we should not only celebrate but also host calls following up on current events in that country, invite international contacts to give reports, and host debates on the contentious issues their organized left is debating.
  3. We should be critical of socialist and anti-imperialist forces when necessary. Most times this should take place internally when other parties take actions we disagree with strategically. But when a leftist party actively betrays socialist principles, such as by attacking abortion rights or supporting Israeli apartheid, we should be willing to make our disagreements public. As for reactionary, anti-communist forces like the governments of Iran and Russia or groups like Hamas and the Houthis, we should make crystal clear our fierce opposition to their politics while also condemning imperialist aggression against them.

Conclusion

My participation in DSA’s delegation to Cuba has been one of the most meaningful experiences I’ve ever had as a socialist, and I genuinely hold nothing but respect and appreciation for the comrades who spent months and years working to make it happen. 

It’s no exaggeration to say that the resilience of Cuba’s revolutionary working-class is a beacon to us all, and a project which must be defended. As we donated over 500 pounds of desperately needed medical and school supplies, witnessed the gains that had been made even with the embargo in place, and navigated one of the last remaining examples of a socialist society, how could we not marvel at all we still have left to fight for? I came back to the US with the sense that our work was far from over – now, it’s our responsibility to tear down the boundaries which separate us and look to the future with an honest, critical, and decisive analysis.

Maria Franzblau
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Maria Franzblau (she/her) is a member of the YDSA at Florida International University and Miami DSA. She is also a member of the Steering Committee of Reform & Revolution.