New Left Formations: Podemos’s Broken Promise

Interview with Anxel Testas from Anticapitalistas in the Spanish State by Stephan Kimmerle

Similar to the dramatic growth experienced by DSA between 2016 and 2020, new left formations have grown exponentially in various countries over the past 15 years. Like DSA, many of these formations have then faced significant challenges, stagnation, and even decline. Stephan Kimmerle from Reform & Revolution spoke with Anxel Testas from Anticapitalistas in the Spanish State about the rise and fall of Podemos, the lessons we can learn from it, and the question of whether and how Marxists should engage in these efforts to build new left parties.

You and your organization, the Anticapitalistas, were involved in the formation of Podemos. However, in 2020, you decided to part ways with this project. Let’s begin with the present: Podemos is now a junior partner in a coalition government with the social-democratic PSOE, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party. How do you evaluate this government, and what role does Podemos play within it? How is this situation connected to the recent electoral gains of the conservative PP and the far-right Vox party in municipal elections?

Podemos is now part of the  government alongside PSOE, which is a social liberal party. While it has its roots in social democracy, PSOE – in government together with Podemos and Izquierda Unida – is committed to upholding capitalist rule in society. It has been a natural progression for a faction within the leadership of Podemos, particularly following the defeat of Syriza in Greece in 2015, to gravitate towards participation in such a government. 

But most workers have not experienced improvements in their quality of life or their social power during Podemos’s time in government. The government has implemented timid liberal measures and is aligned with the capitalist framework of the European Union (EU). They approved funding for the war in Ukraine and the biggest military budget ever. They are supporting NATO. 

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Looking back to 2014 when Podemos was launched, how does this align with the initial hopes and aspirations associated with the party’s founding?

There were high hopes during that time. We closely observed what was happening in Greece and other European countries. Discussions were prevalent in the streets about the need to break with the austerity of the EU and Spanish institutions. Questions arose regarding our debt: should we pay it or not? There was a collective desire to overcome austerity measures. Moreover, we aspired to finally dismantle the regime inherited from the Franco era in 1978.

However, the leadership of Podemos gradually tempered the hopes, expectations, and program of the party over time. This process was already evident in the areas where they held government positions after the 2015 elections, such as Barcelona and Madrid – crucial locations.

In the years following the great recession of 2008, we witnessed a tumultuous period of social struggle amidst the profound crisis of capitalism. Europe experienced protests, including a Southern European one-day general strike. In Spain, during the early 2010s, the Indignados movement emerged, with occupations of major public spaces in cities and demands for “real democracy.” However, within this movement, there was also an anti-party sentiment. In contradiction to this sentiment, Podemos was launched in 2014. What was the relationship between these social protests and the emergence of Podemos? Would you say that Podemos was rooted in these movements, or how would you describe that relationship?

Yes, we witnessed these massive mobilizations and general strikes. There were protest movements taking place at a European level, as well as the independence movement in Catalonia demanding democracy. All of these movements embodied the hopes for a transformative shift away from the existing regime. 

Some argue that the launch of Podemos and the shift towards electoral struggles led to the decline of these movements. I disagree with this perspective. Even during periods of significant social mobilization, tangible achievements were limited. Therefore, there was a growing sentiment, inspired by the developments in Greece, that it was time to engage in politics and participate in elections. This marked a shift in focus towards electoral politics, driven by the belief that we could achieve some successes on the electoral plane. 

As radical activists, we had been engaged in years of fights and struggles, yet it felt like we were trapped in a stalemate. So it  appeared to us that we could possibly have a certain impact in the European elections in 2014, maybe build up some new electoral space, as happened with similar experiences in Galicia and Catalonia. We were surprised to find such significant and immediate success, which reflected an enormous scale of discontent.

You previously mentioned that the defeat of Syriza in Greece was a turning point for the development of Podemos in Spain. There was a moment, before 2015, when there was a discussion in Europe about the possibility of forming entirely different governments to challenge the austerity measures imposed by the European Union, which were dictated by German and other imperialist forces. Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, and even Sinn Fein in Ireland were discussed as potential candidates to lead such governments. In January 2015, Syriza indeed formed a government, but by the middle of that year, it completely changed its approach and capitulated to the demands of the European Union, implementing the austerity measures it had initially promised to fight against. What was the impact of that on Podemos?

It marked a significant turning point for Podemos. Prior to Syriza’s capitulation, Podemos was already a vertically organized bureaucratic party. Nonetheless, the party leadership remained determined to surpass PSOE and occupy its political space in order to forge an alternative path. Syriza’s example was frequently invoked by the leadership as evidence that an alternative approach was feasible.

However, after the capitulation of Syriza to the EU, the leadership of Podemos accepted that it was impossible to do something different in Europe against the European Union. So it changed its strategy completely. This paved the way for entering governments with PSOE, ‘soft’ left governments that basically accepted the framework of capitalism and gave up on any aspiration for system disruption or radical change.

So, Syriza initially served as proof that an alternative was possible. However, with its subsequent surrender, it now proved the opposite: there is no alternative.

Yes, but this was not openly acknowledged. There was extensive discussion about Syriza prior to its capitulation in 2015. However, following Greece’s defeat, there was complete silence, a complete absence of any reflection on the Greek experience. It was as if Greece had ceased to exist.

Nevertheless, based on conversations I’ve had with certain members of the Podemos leadership, it became apparent that this was the prevailing notion after 2015: a break with the EU was deemed impossible, and pushing for further change was considered off-limits.

Based on that, the leadership of Podemos swiftly changed course towards aligning with PSOE. They sought ministerial positions in a government with PSOE. This abrupt shift in strategy had a profound impact on the activists within Podemos at that time. It’s important to note that many of these activists had previously regarded the leadership as brilliant. Challenging this perception proved to be quite difficult. Overnight, PSOE transformed from being opposed as part of the established regime to being a party they sought to govern with.

What alternative options did Syriza have, considering the constraints and coercion from Brussels and Berlin?

It could have honored the outcome of the referendum in Greece, which unequivocally rejected austerity and cuts. The concern was that this decision might have led to Greece’s expulsion from the European Union. Syriza was afraid of using the social power of the working class.

During that period, there was a widespread discussion in both Spain and Greece about a ‘plan B’—a strategy for such a scenario that involved operating outside the framework of the European Union. If it became evident that effecting change within the EU was not feasible, the alternative approach was to pursue change outside of the EU.

Your organization, Anticapitalistas, played a pivotal role in the launch of Podemos. Could you provide some insights into Anticapitalistas?

Anticapitalistas is a radical left organization rooted in the anti-Stalinist tradition of the Spanish State. We consider ourselves the inheritors of the POUM, the Party of Marxist Unity, during the Spanish Civil War, a communist party that stood against Stalinism. In the 1960s and ’70s, we were part of the Communist Revolutionary League inside the IV International. Our comrades in France launched the NPA, the New Anticapitalist Party, in France in 2009. Inspired by their example, but with our own traditions and roots, bringing together activists, trade unionists, and more, we launched our own version of a new anticapitalist party, called Izquierda Anticapitalista, but it never overcame the phase of being a propagandist organization. After we launched Podemos we changed our name to Anticapitalistas, trying to be the radical wing of the broad mass movement in which we were taking part.

Why did you join Podemos, this project to form a broader new left formation without a revolutionary socialist program?

We had numerous debates during that time. Our belief was that the working class needed a mass party, a large workers’ party that would actively engage in various social struggles. We wanted to be part of the process to develop such a party. So we aimed for something more significant than solely advancing our own organization. That’s why we joined forces to launch Podemos alongside a small group of individuals, primarily connected to left-wing circles at universities. These individuals had been highly active in the preceding years and had gained some public recognition through participation in TV debates and other platforms.

Our intention was to experiment in order to make an impact in the European elections, but we didn’t anticipate the magnitude of the explosion we would become part of. We played a significant role, with our organizers operating in different cities, in the initial launch of Podemos. However, the start was so explosive that even a simple Facebook post bearing the name of Podemos had the potential to reach a vast audience. The leadership of Podemos quickly seized upon this momentum, establishing a loosely structured framework that relied heavily on online connections and provided ample room for prominent figures like Pablo Iglesias.

Six years later, in 2020, you left Podemos. Why?

We departed from Podemos when it joined the government as a subordinate ally of PSOE. While we had already encountered numerous differences prior to this, it marked a strategic turning point. Due to the absence of democratic internal practices and the direction taken by the leadership, we found ourselves unable to undertake meaningful initiatives within Podemos any longer. Furthermore, the absence of larger, active social movements during that period contributed to a situation where Podemos became consumed by internal power struggles among influential leaders.

With that in mind, do you think it was a mistake to launch Podemos?

No, we take pride in being part of that process. While we acknowledge that we made some mistakes, we believe it is important for a revolutionary organization to actively participate in real-life processes, even if they take the form of electoral explosions. Despite the challenges posed by the media and complex circumstances, we were able to effectively communicate our political ideals to millions of people.

In the 21st century, building a new party, not just in the Spanish state but in many countries, requires engagement with dynamic and explosive developments. It is through active involvement in these processes that we can contribute to the development of a mass workers’ party.

What would you do differently, knowing what you know now? 

I believe we didn’t make any mistakes in our general approach when we got involved in this process. However, initially, we were naive about the leadership of Podemos. 

We also were not transparent and explicit enough about our role as Anticapitalistas within Podemos. There was an anti-party and even anti-left sentiment prevailing at that time, which created a contradictory atmosphere. We didn’t want to cause distress or distractions. But in hindsight, it was a mistake to not be more explicit because it hindered the acceptance of organizations within Podemos and limited political pluralism. The leadership exploited this situation to suppress us and eliminate the diversity within the political space of Podemos.

We occasionally formed alliances with certain factions within Podemos, such as in opposition to the more moderate forces represented by Íñigo Errejón. However, it was a mistake to expect that joint actions against these moderate forces would automatically shift the entire organization to the left.

We were unable to democratize the party, which was a prerequisite for focusing more on political issues, even though we engaged with a wide range of people and participated in substantive debates. 

As Anticapitalistas you were an organized force within Podemos. The leadership called you a “party in a party”. Was it a mistake to be such an organized force?

No, I believe that was necessary. The mistake we made was not being transparent about it from the beginning. This lack of transparency made us an easy target for criticism. The truth is, other factions, such as those around Iglesias or Errejón, were also well organized, albeit not publicly acknowledged. We should have highlighted this fact.

In reality, we had to strengthen our own organization. Engaging in a mass-scale process brought various pressures, including the need to adapt and the temptation of opportunism. These pressures were not only ideological but also material, as we gained parliamentary representation and had members in city halls. We also had party staff who depended on their wages from the party. It was a challenging situation, and without strengthening our organization, we could have easily succumbed to adaptation.

Therefore, we made a clear decision to ensure our political independence and to advocate for an open organization within Podemos, allowing for diverse opinions and organized currents.

You raised an interesting point about elected officials, which is also relevant from the perspective of DSA in the US. When a party achieves electoral success, its representatives in parliament often become the most prominent figures, somewhat detached from the organization. These individuals face immense pressures from the capitalist state, the mass media, and other influential forces. How can organizations like Podemos or DSA ensure accountability and hold these officials responsible for upholding the principles and the interests of the broader movement? 

Initially, there was a rule in Podemos that placed limits on the wages of elected officials. Party representatives were expected to earn modest wages or the minimum wage, and contribute the remainder of their income to the organization. In the case of Anticapitalistas’ representatives, they were also required to contribute financially to our organization.

Unfortunately, but also telling, is that Podemos weakened and later on broke these rules in the process of adapting to pressures. Podemos did not exhibit strong commitment to these anti-bureaucratic norms. 

Furthermore, we believe it is crucial to strengthen political debate and democracy within the organization. However, in Podemos, this proved challenging as it rapidly became bureaucratized. There was no platform for members to engage in meaningful debate with their representatives. There was not even a national committee with authority to challenge the leadership. This contributed to the lack of democratic culture or structures that could have held those in power accountable.

In contrast, within the Anticapitalistas, we took measures to reinforce our internal democracy. We hired individuals to work exclusively for Anticapitalistas, ensuring their independence from the structures of Podemos and the state. We also enhanced our internal communication channels to facilitate grassroots political debates and mitigate the risk of undesirable adaptations.

But the truth is that  we were confronted with real pressure and some people went over to the other side. However, without engaging in these mass processes, it is impossible to advance.